By: ANDREAS SOLOMOS B.B.M; LL.B
Barrister-at-Law [1]
Copyright © 1996 Andreas Solomos, Barrister-at-Law. All rights reserved.
CONTENTS
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION BETWEEN TURKISH AND GREEK CYPRIOTS
ETHNICITY, ETHNOCENTRICITY AND CULTURES - THE GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS
CYPRUS' CONSTITUTIONAL FIASCO - LESSONS FROM THE PAST
Peace thrives where there is awareness, respect for human rights, commitment to fairness, equality and democracy and where freedom is guarded, promoted and zealously practised.
My fist encounter with Turkish Cypriots was when I was four years of age. My father mounted a donkey and put me in the “front seat” to take me to a Turkish village called Lemba which was situated about 2.5 kilometres southwest of our village, Emba, in the District of Paphos.
It was a sunny August Sunday. We had just attended a religious ceremony commemorating one of the holiest days of the Greek Orthodox faith.
To entice me to go along for the ride, my father described with colourful language and hand movements the delicious Turkish delights that awaited me in the home of this Turkish Cypriot family. To make his point, he started salivating and twisting his tongue inside his mouth in cyclical movements, while uttering noises the kind of which are pronounced by little hungry children when they gather around the family table for dinner.
By the time my father finished his expressions, I was begging him to take me along. And as a master negotiator would, he acted as if he was doing me a favour. Both of us were happy to go, and the visit proved to be a memorable one, although I discovered that the Turkish delights do not grow on trees.
On the way to this house, my father spoke fondly of his friendship to Mr. and Mrs. Adali and their children who were much older than I. His words were filled with praise; his comments were positive and clear. His dedication to his own Christian faith and his values were not compromised by being a close and true friend to this family of Turkish Cypriot Muslims. Many Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the area had similar friendly ties.
While I was playing in the front yard of their home, Mr. and Mrs. Adali were busy showering my father with presents, such as fresh coat cheese and eggs. To show his appreciation and return the favours, my father planted in their yard the little fruit trees he had brought along.
When it was time to go, I saw my father embrace and kiss his friends; they stood by the edge of the whitewashed stone wall, waving goodby as the donkey proceeded steadily and lazily like a guided and programed robot, walking the same steps over an idyllic hill for the journey that took us back home. That was 1954.
A year later, the fight for independence from British rule began. A struggle broke out which lasted until 1959. On August 16, 1960, Cyprus became an independent Republic and soon thereafter a member of the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the Commonwealth.
Unfortunately, independence did not bring the lasting peace one might expect. The 1960 Constitution of the Cyprus Republic was inflexible, impractical and unworkable in many of its provisions. When in 1963 amendments were proposed by the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish minority saw this as an omen for domination and violation of their constitutional rights; instead of engaging in negotiations to resolve the impasse, the two communities allowed the fanatics and extremists amongst them to poison their minds. What followed was the unfolding of many unfortunate events that shattered the peaceful coexistence of the two communities on this beautiful Mediterranean land. Mutual respect and cooperation took the back seat. What exactly went wrong depends on whose side you are on. In July 1974, a military coup was staged by the Greek military Junta then in power in Athens, Greece; the aim of the coup was to overthrow the democratically elected president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios the III. Turkey took advantage of the situation and launched a massive military invasion on July 20, 1974. The result was catastrophic on both sides: communities were uprooted; young men disappeared; loved ones were killed; properties and homes were left behind as families on both sides were forced to leave. One event after another expanded into an avalanche of violence and destruction.
Almost every single family on the island suffered, one way or another. One of my sisters, her husband and two children lost their home and all their belongings and assets when they were forced to flee the northern coastal town of Kyrenia amidst the Turkish bombardments. They also
suffered emotionally because their best memories are linked to that place prior to the Turkish invasion. Undoubtedly others suffered much greater calamities.
In 1994, forty years after my memorable visit to the Turkish Cypriot family, I was visiting a newly-discovered archaeological site of the neolithic age, near the village that the Turkish Cypriot family used to live. As I entered the hats that were reconstructed by the local museum authority, I saw bowls and other clay items that were used by the local inhabitants over 7,000 years ago. I tried to imagine how humans were governing their affairs at that age and how they resolved their disputes. It struck me that traces of their civilization were found after so many thousands of years, even though the island experienced many invaders and natural disasters like earthquakes and epidemics. As I was leaving the site, my eyes gazed at the beautiful blue waters of the Mediterranean and the white, foamy surf that was reaching for the sky every few seconds. On the shoreline, I could see hordes of tourists, their bodies absorbing every sun ray that penetrated the thin, white clouds, oblivious to what had unfolded in the area. My thoughts then took me to this Turkish Cypriot family, their children; their lives in the north; their dreams and hopes; their pains and agonies. Moments later I thought of my sister and the grief she had suffered. I felt hopeless, weak and insignificant to effect any change. Why, I asked, so many innocent people suffered because of their ethnic backgrounds. I took a deep breath of air and filled my lungs with oxygen. And as I felt the gentle wind of the sea caressing my face, I gained confidence and felt hope that one day soon a workable solution to the Cyprus tragedy will be found. I thought, every inch of Cyprus soil should belong to all Cypriots, and everyone should be able to return to his or her home, settle and move about freely anywhere on the island and enjoy its beauty.
This paper is broken into four separate sections. Each section can be read as a more or less independent module. However there is a conceptual thread that attempts to tie them all together.
The first section provides a discussion on the roles of conflict and cooperation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in fostering desirable solutions on the premise that conflict and cooperation are not only inevitable but also mutually reinforcing.
The second section is devoted to a discussion on the dynamics of ethnicity, ethnocentricity and culture in the Cyprus setting.
The third section provides an explanation why the constitutional arrangements that were put in place when the Cyprus Republic was created in 1960 did not work.
The last section attempts to outline the options for Cyprus.
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION BETWEEN TURKISH AND GREEK CYPRIOTS
The overly optimistic have nostalgic reminiscences of the Cyprus that existed before the troubles. They talk of coexistence, sharing, friendship, brotherhood, etc. The pessimists, on the other hand, fear the resumption of violent clashes if the two communities are reunited or interaction between them is enhanced.
Conflict between people is inevitable. The triumvirate of boundless human wants, the social nature of the human condition and scarce resources combine to produce a situation where individuals or groups of individuals within a state or community must compete with others to maximize personal or group satisfaction. Greek Cypriots, for example, are known to be highly competitive, energetic and ambitious individuals, and conflict between them is ever present. The Turkish Cypriots are also experiencing conflict amongst their own people. There already exists in both communities a situation of endless squabbling over who gets what, when and how much of the available positions, benefits, contracts, awards etc. This competition or conflict exists at several levels. At one level, individuals compete directly with other individuals, because getting a promotion, finding a job, getting a government contract, winning a prize or passing an examination are still central concerns of life in both communities.
Conflict transcends the individual level when groups of people with common interests are also in competition with other groups. For example, labour unions in Cyprus compete not only with management but also with each other. The same applies to political parties.
Competition among groups is transcended by broader-based conflict among aggregations of groups. Thus, once a solution is implemented, intergovernmental conflict itself may become an important new dimension of the competition for the scarce resources. Can the new arrangement then survive the shockwaves that may be generated by this fusion? The question is asked primarily not to alarm anyone or to discourage the search for a viable solution but rather to alert the architects of any new arrangements of what may lie ahead so that they put in place the proper mechanisms that will assist the state to withstand shocks and waves of any potential unrest.
The potential for rekindling the conflict between the two communities is real - not imaginary - even after a solution to the Cyprus problem is found. The proximity and involvement of Turkey and Greece in the internal affairs of Cyprus may not lose its current importance unless Turkey and Greece settle their differences once and for all. Cyprus may indeed witness Turkey and Greece competing for power and influence in the area. What position Cyprus will take if the ultimate manifestation of conflict between these two countries is war? [2]
It could be argued that the preeminent conflict between the Greek and Cypriot communities is the direct product of the historic backgrounds of these two ethnic groups. Here the mainspring of conflict is seen to be the long struggle of the Cypriot Greeks to gain their independence and freedom from the Ottoman Empire and later on from the British Empire. But the conflict may lie deeper than that.
Once we accept conflict as inevitable, shall we still implement solutions that will bring the two communities closer to each other, thereby increasing the possibility of escalating conflict? We have seen what happened between the Israelis and Palestinians in September of 1996, when a new uprising of Palestinian youths was joined by Palestinian police who exchanged fire with the Israeli security forces. Many lives were lost and the Mid East peace process suffered a setback because the Israeli and Palestinian leaders did not fully anticipate such occurrences.
Conflict is inherently an inevitable state of affairs when people’s boundless appetites are loosed on a limited environment. Recognizing this will assist the two communities to seek cooperation which is as inevitable as conflict. An example of this is seen following the tragic events in Israel and the Palestinian territories in September of 1996. US president Clinton invited the leaders of Israel, Palestinian Authority and Jordan for a summit at the White House. Initially Arafat and Netanyahu were not on speaking terms, but they subsequently engaged in discussions which resulted in some form of limited cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian police forces for the control of the hostilities.
Cooperation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots when applied properly can yield enormous benefits to both communities. Cooperation would seem to be natural, because both groups, as human beings, are inherently sociable and gregarious and because they have social needs. Moreover, cooperation between the two communities is instrumental because more can be accomplished through a common effort rather than by working separately. Areas where a common effort can yield enormous beneficial effects are plentiful and include the application of Cyprus to join the European Union, potential joint ventures in business and commerce, telecommunications and electronic communications. Close cooperation will most definitely permit high division of labour, greater cost efficiency, and an increased productive capacity, all of which will help to improve the standard of living for all Cypriots. Thus, conflict and cooperation are not only inevitable in the two communities, but these apparently opposite forces, in fact, are mutually reinforcing.
When conflict surfaces, flexible arrangements will help defuse the situation and find a solution. One of the main functions of the new regime is to ensure that conflicts between the two communities are managed in a peaceful and orderly manner. Without a mechanism for the management of intra-ethnic conflicts, the new system would likely not persist over any length of time. Conflict could be managed by resolving specific disputes as they arise and by anticipating potential areas of conflict and then stepping in pre-emptively to halt their development.
It should not be assumed, however, that conflict will be the dominant dimension of interaction between the two ethnic groups. While conflict often seems more visible and newsworthy, the cooperative mechanisms and instruments that will permit the new system to come into existence in the fist place are at least equally significant.
The topic that follows turns to a discussion of the internal variables that determine the conflicts that must be managed.
Cleavages are the politically relevant differences among various groups and individuals. Variables such as race, level of income, or occupation identify differences that very often result in differential policy impacts and can therefore be seen as cleavages. These cleavages can be classified as either vertical or horizontal. Vertical cleavages are based on economic factors, such as level of income, social status, or class. Competing groups in this category square off in political conflicts according to their relative wealth or economic opportunity. Horizontal cleavages are based on non-economic factors, such as ethnicity, gender, and age, which can either cut across or coincide with economic factors.
It is important to recognize that in the case of Cyprus these cleavages are very rarely only one-dimensional factors. For example, ethnic, cultural, and gender variables often coincide at least partially with economic factors. This coincidence deepens the conflict between groups and makes the conflict more difficult to manage. Thus, ethnic conflict between the two communities would be more severe if, for example, the Greek Cypriots appear to enjoy more economic opportunity than the Turkish Cypriots. Thus, difference in employment opportunities between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can exacerbate political conflict.
However, both vertical and horizontal cleavages are crosscutting, a phenomenon which has the effect of diffusing and weakening political conflict. For example, if Turkish and Greek Cypriot workers belong to the same union, the ethnic conflict between them may be reduced because they are on the same side of the economic conflict.
Political scientists tell us that where we live can be an important determinant of how we behave in political circumstances. No doubt in Cyprus, the political process will be organized on territorial terms. Thus, the reclaiming of land and properties, the ability of the refugees to return to their homes, concessions, and compensation on both sides will play an important role in the resolution of the conflict. But once this is settled, what will be more significant in causing Greek and Turkish Cypriots to express different political priorities is not geography or land per se, but other variables; areas or regions will be seen as containers within which the unique economic, cultural and ethnic mix will define local political interests. In this sense, therefore, the present differences that exist between the north and the south of Cyprus will not disappear overnight.
Differences in terrain and the distribution of natural resources create regional disparities. It will be necessary and desirable, therefore, to have a strong central government which will promote a national economy and enhance interaction between peoples and regions for overall economic prosperity.
ETHNICITY, ETHNOCENTRICITY AND CULTURES - THE GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS
Ethnicity is simply an accident of one’s birth. If our parents happened to be Greek or Turkish or Armenian, then our ethnic origin will be, by definition, Greek or Turkish or Armenian. But what is most important politically about ethnicity in not the simple genetic accident that links all of us to one or more national or cultural groups, but the various factors that are normally tied to ethnic origin. The pattern of values and attitudes is ultimately what makes a group different from other groups. It is not the language spoken at home or the unique styles of dress, but, rather, the beliefs of the group, and the behavioural patterns that reflect those beliefs, that make ethnicity significant.
The geographical concentration of the Turkish Cypriots in the northern and the Greek Cypriots in the southern part of Cyprus, will tend to exaggerate and reinforce social and ethnic differences.
Of particular importance in defining an ethnic group’s culture is the group’s religion. Paradoxically, since 1571 when Cyprus was conquered by the Ottomans, Greek - Turkish conflict in Cyprus has not been exacerbated by the coincident Greek Orthodox - Muslim religious differences. While the intensity of religious conflict has never been an important dimension in Cyprus, there remains the real prospect of the two communities being divided along religious lines. Cyprus, as a society, has not advanced to the stage where we can conclude that religious differences are not an important manifestation of ethnic conflict between the two communities. [3]
Religious differences also tend to coincide with ethnic ones, thereby reinforcing and exaggerating the ethno cultural conflict. Thus, in order to minimize this factor as an element of conflict, special care should be taken to clearly separate the functions of the state from religion, the church and religious organizations.
Ethnic conflict can also be enhanced by economic disparities between the two ethnic groups. Thus, the elimination of any wide disparities in wealth and economic opportunity among the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots should be an important strategy for managing ethnic conflict. For effective implementation of such measures, the new arrangement should offer equal opportunity and freedom of movement of goods, services and people. It is recognized, however, that there are obstacles to the effective moderation of ethnic differences that go deeper than economic disparities. These must be dealt with directly and not only through economic redistributive measures.
The issues of assimilation and integration need to be addressed and elaborated here. Assimilation is the process whereby the various ethnic components of the Cyprus society (eg Greeks, Turkish, Armenians, Maronites, Latinos, etc) become absorbed or dissolved by the majority or mainstream ethnic mélange and ultimately the component parts cease to be distinguishable. What is gained in this form of nation building is a reduction or elimination of ethnic cleavage and a higher degree of consensus. What is lost, however, is the richness of a truly multicultural society.
By contrast, integration recognizes that the groups that make up a multi-ethnic or pluralist society have unique cultural characteristics that can often enhance and strengthen the whole community. Thus, minority ethnic groups are permitted to retain their cultural distinctiveness and at the same time participate fully in, enjoy the benefits of, and contribute to the shared experience of being a citizen.
The model that may best suited in Cyprus is the integrative or pluralist one. Any new constitutional arrangements should reflect this model from the outset with constitutional guarantees and equality provisions. This model has been applied in Canada with considerable success. [4]
It would be unrealistic to compare Canada with Cyprus, as these two countries are vastly different, historically, politically and economically. What is important, however, is to realize that many countries plagued by communal violence watch the Canadian experience very closely. Pretoria, for example, has recently signalled that Canada, with its values of tolerance, civility and stability, will be the next stage of South Africa’s evolution as a multicultural democracy. Yet as Canadian multiculturalism picks up laurels abroad, some inside Canada see the phenomenon as a threat to unity. A columnist for a Canadian Newspaper went as far as to declare that Canadians fear being ‘fractured beyond recovery by some metastatic, separate justice systems, chadors, saris and kilts’. It is also clear that visible minorities in Canada generally suffer from a slower rate of integration into the Canadian society than do traditional immigrant groups from European countries. Thus, while Canada offers many good examples for emulation, it is not necessarily fitting to assume that the Canadian example will be met with success if applied in Cyprus. Any solution shall be based on the particular set of facts and circumstances as they exist in Cyprus. Having regard to the past, it would be unrealistic to expect the two communities to become instant friends and partners. The process of reconciliation would be gradual and often difficult as the two communities try to adjust.
The resolution of the current differences between the two sides, although admittedly difficult, at least in theoretical terms is possible. But even if a compromised plan is implemented, many of the conflicts will remain difficult to resolve. Part of the explanation for the persistence and pervasiveness of conflict between the two communities is the psychological phenomenon of ethnocentrism. In the root of ethnocentrism is a seemingly natural tendency in each group to perceive the situation in ‘we-they’ terms. This consciousness of ethnic differences has historically facilitated growth of nationalistic tendencies along ‘Greek’ or ‘Turkish’ lines and has permitted cultural differentiation to be emphasized and reinforced. While such differentiation may have benefits in organizing international politics, in fostering integration and enriching the cultural mosaic of Cyprus, it can have negative consequences. If not controlled with effective policies, ethnocentrism can lead to inter-communal conflict and can be a serious disintegrate force.
While this broad systemic implication of ethnocentrism is important, perhaps the most serious result of this phenomenon within the Cyprus context is the hardship and injustice it imposes on both communities. The paradox with Cyprus is that although the Turkish Cypriots are a minority, any continued influence and interference by mainland Turkey would have adverse effects to the democratic process, as the Greek Cypriot majority will continue to perceive themselves as a ‘minority’ in that context. Thus, the continued reliance of the Turkish Cypriot leadership on “motherland” Turkey to guarantee the security of the Turkish Cypriots, the continued interference by Turkey and the continued presence of the Turkish army on the island, create a vicious circle, which feeds on itself and becomes a self-perpetrating tragedy of human relationships between the two communities.
Time and the political will to do so can ultimately eliminate the current mistrust between the two communities. But the psychological dimensions of ethnocentrism will remain the most critical barrier to the fuller integration of the two communities. Thus, while it may be possible to find a political solution to the current Cyprus situation, the ultimate means of reducing conflict must be found with additional changes on the part of individual Cypriots. The chances of peaceful coexistence can be enhanced if both communities learn to accept ethnic and social differences without prejudice and if the educational institutions of Cyprus, communications media, and public policies actively foster the goal of greater understanding among Greek and Turkish Cypriots and all other minorities.
At present the two communities, divided as they are, are culturally dominated by their “mother” countries to a larger extent and by American and European cultures to a lesser extent. A number of factors facilitate the impact of Greek and Turkish cultures on Cyprus. Greek Cypriot TV stations carry a great deal of Greek programming. The same applies to Turkish Cypriot TV stations. But European and American shows are also viewed by both communities.
Children and adults alike pick up cultural images from television and it is well known that, at this day and age, television has contributed significantly to the loss of regional and national identities. However, in the case of Cyprus, the two communities continue to preserve their cultural identities.
Cyprus has a unique and complex relationship with Greece and Turkey, the two neighbours whose nationals identify with the respective communities who live on the island. It must, therefore, be recognized that Cyprus, Greece and Turkey do not have much choice in the matter. The Greek Cypriots, for example, share similar historical roots with the Greeks from Greece and Greek as a common language. The economic, cultural and political relationship between Greece and Cyprus is mutually beneficial and very few Greek Cypriots, even the most strident critics of the Greek foreign or domestic policies, would suggest today that Cyprus should extricate itself from this arrangement.
But Cypriots, both Greek and Turkish alike, have always had an ambivalent attitude toward Greece and Turkey. In some fashion, the Cypriot way of life has been more attractive in terms of its affluence and liberal values. Most Cypriots therefore have never seen Greece or Turkey as models against which to measure their own success. They turn instead to the west for their aspirations, although they do not wish to incorporate the more negative dimensions of western Europe or America, such as extremely high violent crime rates.
Hence, it is the opinion of this writer, while to a great extent, as peoples, Cypriots are influenced by their Greek and Turkish neighbours, the do not want to be them. The ‘Cypriot’ way of doing things is different from either the Greek or Turkish way, and it appears that the Cypriots (Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Maronites and Latinos) like the differences. But if Cypriots as a whole wish to enhance and promote their own uniqueness and identity, Cyprus must remain a separate sovereign country, with a distinctive political culture where its own national consciousness would be allowed to flourish, even if understated by Greece or Turkey. Cypriots are subtle enough to recognize both the good things and bad things about Greece and Turkey.
CYPRUS' CONSTITUTIONAL FIASCO - LESSONS FROM THE PAST
Introduction
Due to its strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus had been occupied and colonized by many empires and super powers since time immemorial. [5] The presence of the Turkish minority on the island goes back to the occupation of Cyprus by the Ottoman troops. In 1570 AD, the Ottomans attacked Cyprus, captured Nicosia, its capital, and later Famagusta, the present day Varosha. In the process thousands of Greek Cypriots were executed, as well as many Venetians who were occupying the island at that time. Under the 1878 Cyprus Convention, Britain assumed administration of the island. Cyprus remained formally part of the Ottoman Empire until 1914 when Britain annexed it, after the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on the side of Germany. In 1923, under the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey renounced any claim to Cyprus. The latest colonization was in 1925 when Cyprus was formally declared a British Crown Colony. From 1875, when Cyprus was handed over to Britain, to April 1955 when the Greek Cypriots began their struggle for independence from British rule, the Turks and Greeks in Cyprus lived along side each other in a peaceful coexistence.
When the Cypriots began their armed conflict with Britain in 1955, seeking independence, the British Government encouraged Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to seek a separate arrangement for ‘self-determination’: the partition of Cyprus. As a result, a number of Turkish Cypriots aided and abetted the colonial power, opposed the struggle for independence from British rule, and advocated either partition or the continuation of British colonial rule.
The bitter fruits of independence
Cyprus was proclaimed an independent country on August 16, 1960, but instead of maturing naturally as a Republic, the island engulfed in a bitter inter-communal struggle that began with the 1963 hostilities and ended with the Turkish invasion of July and August of 1974. Since then Turkey has been occupying about 37% of the territory of the Cyprus Republic. As a result of the invasion, over 200,000 Greek Cypriots had been displaced. Thousands of Greek Cypriots were killed and 1619 are still missing. Since the invasion, Turkey forced the movement of 50,000 Turkish Cypriots to the northern part of Cyprus and participated in and promoted the importation of thousands of illegal aliens from Turkey, in an attempt to boost the local Turkish minority.
It has often been said that the cause of the inter-communal hostilities originated from the Constitution of Cyprus, a document that was drafted by the Joint Constitutional Commission which was set up pursuant to Part VIII of the London Agreement of February 19, 1959. The Commission was comprised of representatives from Turkey, Greece and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.
The Constitution proved to be an unworkable and impractical piece of legislation, a formula for division and stalemate. The drafters of the Constitution unwisely introduced the establishment of a divisional element along ethnic and racial characteristics. The Constitution divided the Cypriot citizens into two communities on the basis of ‘ethnic origin’. [6]
The Council of Ministers was composed of ten ministers, three of whom had to be Turkish Cypriots and to be nominated by the Vice President. To further complicate matters and create an atmosphere of distrust, division and confusion in the House of Representatives, the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot representatives had to be elected separately by their own communities. The emphasis on ethnic origin caused apprehension in the minds of all who, from that point on, were constantly reminded that they should not deal with each other as ordinary human being with common needs and wants but rather as separate people along ethnic lines.
Any modification of legislation pertaining to elections, municipal affairs or fiscal policies, required separate simple majorities of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members of the House. Thus, it took only eight Turkish Cypriot members to defeat a bill voted in favour by forty-two members, thirty-five being Greek Cypriot and seven being Turkish Cypriots. Such impractical formula let to a virtual paralysis of many of the affairs of the newly-created Cyprus state. For example, in 1963, when the fiscal laws according to Article 78 of the Constitution expired, the fifteen Turkish Cypriot members defeated an Income Tax bill that was overwhelmingly voted in favour by the thirty-five Creek Cypriot members.
The drafters of the 1960 Constitution deserve some credit for being over protective with respect to the rights of the Turkish minority. But instead of protecting these rights along flexible and realistic lines, the ‘equality’ that the Constitution sought to address reversed into an inequality against the Greek Cypriot majority.
Prior to independence and while Cyprus was under British administration, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges tried all cases irrespective of the ethnic origins of the litigant or accused. The documents relating to the founding of Cyprus [7] provided that disputes among Creek Cypriots be tried by Creek Cypriot judges and disputes among Turkish Cypriot be tried by Turkish Cypriot judges, a formula that implies bias and partiality. Disputes between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots had to be dealt with by ‘mixed courts’ composed of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges. The procedure proved to be not only expensive but also conducive to creating a biased judiciary.
The division of the two ethnic communities was exacerbated by establishing the so-called Greek and Turkish ‘Communal Chambers’, bodies with legislative powers regarding educational, religious, cultural, sporting and charitable matters, cooperative and credit societies, and questions of personal status. Such separation was ill conceived and impractical because it restricted freedom of choice, contributed to systemic discrimination and proved to be expensive to run.
The London Agreement provided that the Civil Service shall be composed of 70% Greeks and 30% Turks. No mention is made of other minorities, such as the Armenians, Maronites, Latinos and others. Similarly, the Turkish Cypriots had to comprise 40% of the police and armed forces.
In 1963, the first president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, suggested thirteen amendments to the constitution, one being the unification of the municipalities and another being the abolition of the Greek Communal Chamber, but the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected it. No flexible arrangements existed for changes to suit the practical requirements and new circumstances. As such, the system paralysed.
As social and economic conditions are continually changing, political institutions must be flexible enough to react and adapt fairly quickly to new circumstance. Formal institutions such as the House of Representatives, the Council of Ministers and the bureaucracy should be structured to meet new circumstances fairly easily. These institutions, therefore, should have sufficient flexibility to be able to react directly and immediately to rapid changes.
The constitution, on the other hand, shall be the symbol of stability and predictability over time. It should only be changed through formal amendments, or gradually through the evolution of new practices. Thus, the function of the constitution is to provide the new system with a backbone and give the governmental system the overall structural integrity that would allow it to persist over time.
The constitution of a state defines the relationship between the citizen and the state. The authority of the state must be exercised only through legal process. Having a constitution is a necessary condition for achieving the rule of law.
If any constitutional arrangements are to be effective and viable, they must assert that any interference with the rights and freedoms of any individual may be imposed only according to the legal process and carried out by legitimate authorities. No one should be exempt from the law, neither religious leaders nor officials of the government. There should be equality before the law for all members of the Cypriot political community. All laws should be impersonal, impartial, predictable and rational.
The question then remains, what form of government should be most suitable for the new system.
The Turkish invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974 brought about a forced separation of peoples who prior to that event were living in mixed communities and interacting with each other throughout the island. The 18.3 % Turkish Cypriot minority had properties and wealth but in terms of land ownership, it is known that they did not possess more than 12% of the island. The Turkish army who invaded Cyprus in 1974 illegally divided the island in two, occupying about 37% of Cyprus. And
despite world condemnation and numerous UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of the Turkish Army from Cyprus, Turkey continuous to defy the world and persistently violates the human rights of the Cypriot people. Since the Turkish occupation of Cyprus, sacred monuments of the rich Cyprus heritage have been destroyed in the occupied areas and people are not allowed to return to their homes and worship their Christian faith in the Churches of their ancestors inherited from generation to generation since early Christianity.
Should then an unjust, illegal, undemocratic and unfair result be tolerated by the Cypriot people and the world community? To give any recognition to these forced changes implies acquiescence to the mighty force of coercion, violation of human rights and partition of Cyprus. On the pretext of protecting the minority Turkish Cypriots, Turkey has violated many fundamental rights of the Cypriot citizens, including the right to live in a free and unified country and the right to own and enjoy property anywhere on the island. The documents relating to the founding of Cyprus as an independent Republic, including the Treaty of Guarantee, that were signed at Lancaster House, London, in February 19, 1959 do not give such power or authority to Turkey.
Once Turkey removes its occupying army and its illegal aliens, and ceases to interfere in the internal affairs of Cyprus, the Cypriots should be left alone to choose for themselves the system that will govern them. True, both communities may wish to preserve their linguistic, religious and cultural characters, and both sides may wish to retain control over matters that would allow them to preserve their traditions, but they should have the right and opportunity to give one more chance to a reformulated legislative union which may prove to be a fair, viable and efficient arrangement in the long run.
A number of people advocate a solution on the basis of some kind of economic trade alliance between the two communities. But they are not prepared to go any further. The problem with such a proposal is that the arrangement would lack decision making powers and since there would be no derogation of the sovereignty of the signatories of the treaty of alliance, the alliance itself would be powerless to enforce its own provisions. A second problem with such a loose form of union is that it would be ineffectual in financing any joint economic programs of great importance to the economic prosperity of Cyprus. The third problem with such a proposal is the potential economic conflict between the two signatories. A fourth major disadvantage of any form of less-than-political union is that it would lack permanence and may contribute to instability and unpredictability. By its own nature, a trade alliance would offer the right to the two members to withdraw from it at any time if they felt the terms of the alliance were no longer advantageous. It is obvious if the economic and political problems of Cyprus are to be solved, they should have to be dealt with continuously over a long period of time; it is not possible to find immediate cures of the ills of Cyprus. The fifth drawback of a simple trade alliance is that it may hinder or delay Cyprus’ plans for full membership status in the European Union. [8]
A sixth problem with a simple alliance is that such an alliance would be functionally specific. In other words, the terms of reference or functions of the alliance are set very specifically at the outset, in such a way that new needs of the members of the alliance cannot be addressed without renegotiating the original agreement. In a rapidly changing world, a form of union that could adapt itself to the performance of the new functions is imperative.
Much discussion is also made of the confederation option. A confederal union in Cyprus is also an alternative, but when this form of union is subjected to close scrutiny, it becomes clear that it provides only a slightly higher levels of political integration than an alliance. A confederation is a union of sovereign states that features a permanent central decision- making body, or congress, to which the members of the confederation send delegates. In terms of the matters with which it deals, a confederation is considerably broader than an alliance, for the central congress is empowered to make decisions concerning a wide range of subjects.
The weakness of confederation is that, as with an alliance, there is no transfer of sovereignty from the member states to the central congress. While empowered to make decisions, the congress is given no power to enforce them, and the members of the confederation can, if they choose, refuse to comply with any decision with which they disagree. The parties to a confederation agreement also have the right to secede from the union if they feel that its terms or reference no longer provide sufficient benefits.
Thus, while the confederal form of union is functionally more diffuse than an alliance, it suffers from many of the same faults. The historical lesson of the United States under the Articles of Confederation in the 1780s, with the chaotic and unpredictable conditions that prevailed during that period should offer the Cypriots ample cause for avoiding that particular form of union.
As stated earlier, a rearranged unitary form of government under certain conditions may prove to be the most fair and viable option for Cyprus in the long run. The second best option is a federal union. Unlike an alliance or a confederal union, a true federal union vests real powers in the hands of a central legislature, the federal parliament or government. In a federal system, sovereignty is distributed among provincial and federal governments, and the exercise of legislative and executive powers is confined to subject matters allotted to each level of government by the constitution. A federal system is also an unbreakable and permanent union, in the sense that the member states or provinces do not have the constitutional right to withdraw unilaterally from the union. While this prohibition may prove unenforceable in practice if the people of a member state were determined to secede, the law of a federal state is indivisible.
In a federal system, the constitution distributes legislative authority between the central or federal government and the provincial or regional governments. The division of power is intended to be exhaustive, which means all matters of legislative authority are parcelled out and must fall within the jurisdiction of the two orders of government. In a confederal union, on the other hand, it is simply assumed that the provincial governments have the responsibility for everything except a few matters that are specifically the responsibility of the confederation. Thus, in the case of confederation, the residual power is always left in the provinces, and constitutes the larger area of jurisdiction. By contrast, in a federal system, the jurisdiction of the two levels of government (provincial/federal) is parcelled out more comprehensively and the residual area of jurisdiction is intended to be very small. For Cyprus, the advantage of such a comprehensive definition of the powers and responsibilities of government is that all elements of uncertainty would be eliminated, as each level of government would be in possession of exclusive and sovereign powers that cannot be encroached upon by the other level of government. Unlike the central congress in a confederal union, the national government in a federal system has the authority to make a range of decisions that are binding on the citizens of the provinces. In addition, the national or central government is granted the power to enforce those decisions
The Turkish invasion in 1974 brought about a pattern of forced territorial separation which is in violation of the territorial integrity of The Republic of Cyprus. Without a strong and effective system in place to guarantee the continued sovereignty of Cyprus, the danger of a permanent partition is real.
And as time progresses, the need for a solution becomes more pressing. The events of August and October, 1996, certainly demonstrate the premise that unless a solution is found soon, the situation may become explosive and dangerous. The killings of two Greek Cypriot civilians , Tasos Isaak and his nephew Solomos Solomos, in August, 1996, by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkish soldiers from Turkey met the condemnation of the international community and brought the island on the brink of renewed hostilities. The Turkish side killed another civilian, Petros Kakoullis, age 55, in October, 1996. Kakoullis was out in the fields, near the zone separating the two sides, collecting snails in order to feed his family. He was shot three times by Turkish soldiers, and there are reports that the last shot was fired at him while lying on the ground mortally wounded.
Certainly these crimes do not contribute to the peaceful resolution of the Cyprus conflict. What these events demonstrate is that a simple and defacto geographical separation of the two communities without a viable agreement in place will not lead to permanent peace.
The European Parliament passed a resolution on October 24,1996, declaring its shock “by the latest cold-blooded murder in Cyprus of yet another Greek Cypriot, Petros Kakoullis, in Cyprus by the Turkish occupational army”. The European Parliament also called upon Member States to respond with continued firm pressure on Turkey with the aim to free the island of the presence of all Turkish troops, guaranteeing freedom of movement for all citizens and working for a just and peaceful solution of the current Cyprus problem, along the lines of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
The continued presence of the Turkish army in Cyprus is illegal, morally reprehensible and represents an affront to all democratic processes and institutions. The arrogant insistence of Turkey to continue the occupation of 37% of the island despite international condemnation, is not serving the best interests of the Turkish Cypriots. The insecurity the Turkish Cypriots may fear cannot and should not be addressed by resorting to Turkey for protection, but by ensuring the continued territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Cyprus Republic. By strengthening their commitment to a unified Cyprus the Greek and Turkish Cypriots stand to gain in terms of economic prosperity, lasting peace and true independence.
By choosing to be members of a new system of government, Cypriots would have to agree to live by the rules as determined by their governments(s). But while the exclusive power to employ coercion will lend a great deal of authority to the governmental enactments, a system that will rely only on coercion in order to make its decisions effective would be neither stable nor efficient. Too large a percentage of the available resources would be utilized in merely keeping the citizens in line. For a governmental system to persist, therefore, it must acquire legitimacy. Both ethnic groups must accept the new system not merely because they have to, but because the choose to - because they agree that the new governmental structure with its authorities and divisions of powers is a ‘fair’ arrangement.
Thus, any new system that purports to solve ‘the Cyprus problem’ would require legitimacy in many ways. The two groups may accept it and it may persist, only if its values and norms are acceptable to both.
[1]Andreas Solomos was born in Cyprus. He has been living in Canada since 1970. He has Law and Business degrees from Canadian Universities and he is a member of The Law Society Of Upper Canada. His law office is situated in Toronto. Comments about this paper may be addressed to Mr. Andreas Solomos, Barrister-at-Law, 1172 Danforth Avenue, Toronto, Canada. Tel:( 416) 465- 9955. Fax: (416) 465- 8114.
Web: http://pages.total.net/~asolomos
copyright © 1996 Andreas Solomos, Barrister-at-Law. All rights reserved.
[2]That is why the offer of the Cyprus government to a complete demilitarization of the island has such an enormous appeal and makes a great deal of sense. Regrettably, however the Turkish Cypriot leadership is keen to support the presence of the Turkish occupational forces on the island on the pretext of security.
[3]When religious differences tend to coincide with territorial issues, such differences will help to reinforce and exaggerate ethno- cultural conflict in general. For example, it is well known that the two sides had numerous rounds of talks since 1974 in search of a solution. In May 19, 1979 the then president of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, and the Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Denktash met and reached an agreement on a ten point program outlining the procedure to be followed for fresh negotiations. The ten point program called for negotiations to be carried out in ‘a continuing and sustained manner’. The two sides agreed to give priority to the resettlement of the coastal town of Varoshia also known as Famacusta. Such plans, however, were frustrated when EVKAF, a Turkish Cypriot religious trust, claimed that Varosha belonged to the Pashas during the Ottoman rule and was subsequently inherited by EVKAF. Following a well orchestrated law suit in the courts under Turkish Cypriot administration in the north of Cyprus, it was ruled, that EVKAF property in Varosha should be protected and therefore Varosha should not form part of the inter-communal talks until the final determination of the law suit. This prompted the Greek Cypriot side to declare this move illegal and unconstitutional, and no doubt the talks suffered a set back because of that decision alone. Criticism for the involvement of EVKAF also came from some Turkish quarters.
[4] Although admittedly Canada continues to experience political uncertainty with respect to Quebec’s demands for recognition as ‘a distinct society’ and a veto against constitutional change. In this context, English Canadians are reluctant to give Quebec a status different from that of the other provinces.
[5] Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean, with an area of 9,251 square kilometres. Its location is more important than its size. It lies in the north-eastern corner of the east Mediterranean basin, often described as ‘the meeting point’ of three continents - Europe, Asia and Africa. Cyprus’ population as at the end of 1992 was 718,000. The Turkish Cypriots account for 18.3% of the population. The Greek Cypriots comprise the majority. Other minorities include Maronites, Armenians and Latins. The origins of the present day Greek Cypriots can be traced as far back as the 13th century BC, when Mycenaeans from Greece came to the island as merchants and immigrants. During the 12th and 11th centuries BC, Achaean Greeks come to settle on the island bringing with them their Greek civilization, Greek language and culture, all of which helped to Hellenise the island.
[6] Dr. Galo Plaza, the mediator appointed by the United Nations in March 1965 to mediate the disputes between the two communities, described the 1960 Constitution as ‘a constitutional oddity’.
[7]Signed in Lancaster House, London, on February 19, 1959.
[8] In 1972 Cyprus signed an Association Agreement with the European Union. This was followed with the signing of a Protocol for the setting of a Customs Union in January 1987. In 1990 Cyprus submitted its application to join the European Union. On June 30, 1993 the Commission issued its Opinion confirming that Cyprus is eligible for accession. On March 6, 1995, the Council of the European Union decided that the Union would start accession negotiations with Cyprus six months after the conclusion of Intergovernmental Conference. The latter is expected to be concluded in 1997. Officials of the Cyprus government anticipate that if everything proceeds as planned, accession would take place in the year 2000.